Abstract-Simplified verifiable re-encryption mix-net (SVRM) is revised and a scheme for e-voting systems is developed based on it. The developed scheme enables evoting systems to satisfy all essential requirements of elections. Namely, they satisfy requirements about privacy, verifiability, fairness and robustness. It also successfully protects voters from coercers except cases where the coercers force voters to abstain from elections. In detail, voters can conceal correspondences between them and their votes, anyone can verify the accuracy of election results, and interim election results are concealed from any entity. About incoercibility, provided that erasable-state voting booths which disable voters to memorize complete information exchanged between them and election authorities for constructing votes are available, coercer C cannot know candidates that voters coerced by C had chosen even if the candidates are unique to the voters. In addition, elections can be completed without reelections even when votes were handled illegitimately.
Introduction
E-voting systems are expected to make elections efficient, accurate and economical, but when elections are computerized, voters are faced with serious threats. For example, simple computerization enables election authorities to know correspondences between voters and their votes. Also, entity C that is coercing voter V becomes able to confirm whether V had chosen C's designating candidate or not. E-voting systems applicable to real elections must satisfy the following requirements.
Privacy Correspondences between voters and their
votes must be concealed from others including election authorities. It is preferable that voters can conceal also their abstentions from others. 2. Verifiability Anyone including voters and third parties must be able to verify the accuracy of elections, i.e. e-voting schemes must be able to convince anyone that only and all votes from eligible voters had been counted. 3 . Fairness Interim election results influence ways voters choose candidates; therefore interim election results must be concealed from anyone including election authorities. 4 . Incoercibility To disable entity C that is coercing voter V to confirm that V actually had chosen C's designating candidate S, e-voting schemes must disable even V itself to identify its vote in election results. Here, C must be disabled to know whether V had chosen S or not even if S is unique to V. 5. Robustness To conduct elections fairly even when relevant entities behave dishonestly, voting schemes must be able to complete elections without reelections or any help of dishonest voters. Here if helps from dishonest voters are required, the schemes cannot complete the election when they disappear. However, despite that many schemes had been developed, they cannot satisfy all of the above requirements completely [2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12] . For example, although many schemes satisfy receipt freeness, if entity C that is coercing voter V asks V to choose candidate S that is unique to V, C can easily know whether V had actually chosen S or not. Here, receipt freeness is the base of incoercibility, i.e. it disables C to force V to show its receipt that includes the candidate V had chosen. This paper modifies simplified verifiable reencryption mix-net (SVRM) [14] to revised-SVRM, and develops an e-voting scheme that satisfies all the above requirements based on it together with anonymous tag based credentials [13, 15, 16 ]. An anonymous credential enables voter V to convince others that it is eligible without revealing its identity, and provided that erasablestate voting booths are available, the verifiable feature of revised-SVRM ensures election authorities' legitimate handling of votes while concealing correspondences between voters and their votes from entities including voters themselves. In addition, the scheme regards votes for candidates that could not obtain enough supports as inferior votes and does not count them in the tallying phase [13] . Then, entity C that is coercing V cannot confirm whether V had chosen C's designating candidate or not even when thetttttttttttttttttttttttt candidate is unique to V. About fairness and robustness, it is easy to satisfy them as same as in other schemes. In the above, an erasable-state voting booth is a one that disables voters to memorize complete information exchanged between them and election authorities during they are constructing their votes.
Security Components

Simplified Verifiable Re-encryption Mix-net (SVRM)
Re-encryption mix-net M consists of multiple mutually independent mix-servers M 1 , M 2 , ---, M Q and M Q , M Q-1 , ---, M 1 that are arrayed in encryption and decryption stages respectively as shown in Figure 1 mod p } by using their secret integers k j (1), k j (2), ---, k j (Q) to be decrypted in the decryption stage. Here, provided that g and p are publicly known appropriate integers (p is a prime number), {x(q), y(q) = g x(q) mod p } is mix-server M q 's secret decryption and public encryption key pair of an ElGamal encryption function, and <x * = {x(1)+x(2)+ ---+x(Q)} mod p , y * = y(1)y(2)---y(Q) mod p = g x* mod p > is a common secret decryption and public encryption key pair. Also, k j * (q) = a j +k j (1)+k j (2)+ ---+k j (q), and in the remainder, notation mod p is omitted when confusions can be avoided.
In detail, each M q in the encryption stage calculates {g kj*(q-1) g kj(q) = g kj*(q) , D j y * kj*(q-1) y * kj(q) = D j y * kj*(q)
} from {g kj*(q-1) , D j y * kj*(q-1) } received from M q-1 . After that M q shuffles its calculation results, and forwards them to M q+1 . In the decryption stage, M Q , M Q-1 , ---, M 1 decrypt each {g kj*(Q) , D j y * kj*(Q) = D j g kj*(Q)·x* } to {g kj*(Q) , D j }. Namely, each M q decrypts {g kj*(Q) , D j g kj*(Q)·x*(q) } received from M q+1 to {g kj*(Q) , D j g kj*(Q)·x*(q) /g kj*(Q)·x(q) = D j g kj*(Q)·x*(q-1)} } by using its secret key x(q), and forwards it to M q-1 . Here x * (q) = x(1)+x(2)+ ---+x(q).
Then, no one except V j can know V j 's attribute value D j unless all mix-servers conspire because any one cannot know all integers k j (1), k j (2), ---, k j (Q) or all decryption keys x(1), x(2), ---, x(Q). Entities other than V j cannot know integer a j either.
However, because integers k 1 (q), k 2 (q), ---, k N (q) and decryption key x(q) are known only to M q and M q in the encryption stage shuffles its encryption results, no one can notice even when mix-servers encrypt or decrypt attribute values dishonestly. SVRM M * shown in Figure 2 enables any entity E to verify behaviors of mix-servers by preparing the unknown number generation stage [14] . In the following it is assumed that all information sent from each entity V j and mix-server M q is publicly disclosed. (Q) +u j (1) +u j (2)+ ---+u j (q) and v j * (q) = R j +v j (1)+v j (2)+ ---+v j (q). Then, the final decryption results enable M * to convince any verifier E of its legitimate encryptions, decryptions and shuffling. Namely, because each attribute value D j is finally decrypted to F 0 (D j ) = <{g kj*(Q) , D j = α j }, {g uj*(Q) , R j = β j }, {g vj*(Q) , D j Rj+Λ = γ j }>, at least one mix-server is dishonest when relation α j βj+Λ = γ j does not hold for some j. However, each M q that knows public encryption keys y(1), y(2), ---, y(Q) can easily forge encryption and decryption forms E q (D j ) and F q-1 (D j ) so that their final decryption result <{g kj*(Q) , α j }, {g uj*(Q) , β j }, {g vj*(Q) , γ j }> satisfies relation α j βj+Λ = γ j . M * removes this possibility as below.
Firstly each M q discloses κ q = k 1 (q)+k 2 (q)+ ---+k N (q), and verifier E convinces itself that the product of E q (D 1 ),
(q-1) and G k2 (q) = y * κq G k2 (q-1), and requests M q to iterate the encryption stage until the relations hold. Where {G k1 (q),
is incorrect, because solving discrete logarithm problems is difficult, M q that does not know x * cannot find value κ q so that G k1 (q) = g κq G k1 (q-1) and G k2 (q) = y * κq G k2 (q-1) hold [3, 4] . On the other hand, although M q discloses κ q , it can maintain each k j (q) as its secret.
Here, actually M q can find integer κ q even if E q (D j ) is incorrect when E q (D j ) is calculated in a specific way, but in this case final decryption result <{g kj*(Q) , α j }, {g uj*(Q) , β j }, {g vj*(Q) , γ j }> does not satisfy relation α j βj+Λ = γ j . For example, if M q encrypts {g kj*(q-1) , D j y * kj*(q-1) } in E q-1 (D j ) and {g kh*(q-1) , D h y * kh*(q-1) } in E q-1 (D h ) to {g kj*(q) , λD j y * kj*(q) } and {g kh*(q) , (1/λ)D h y * kh*(q) } instead of {g kj*(q) , D j y * kj*(q) } and {g kh*(q) , D h y * kh*(q) } (λ is an arbitrarily integer), value κ q = k 1 (q)+k 2 (q)+ ---+k N (q) still satisfies G k1 (q) = g κq G k1 (q-1) and G k2 (q) = y * κq G k2 (q-1 
. Under these settings, E determines mix-servers in the decryption stage are dishonest when relation G d = y * a1+a2+ ---+aN+κ1+κ2+ ---+κQ does not hold. Namely, apparently G d must be equal to y * a1+a2+ ---+aN+κ1+κ2+ ---+κQ if E Q (D 1 ), ---, E Q (D N ) are correctly decrypted. On the other hand, it is computationally infeasible to find different values that satisfy relation G d = y * a1+a2+ ---+aN+κ1+κ2+ ---+κQ as the decryption forms. In detail, although M q can forge F q-1 (D j ) while satisfying G d = y * a1+a2+ ---+aN+κ1+κ2+ ---+κQ as M q in the encryption stage calculates {g kj*(q) , λD j y * kj*(q) }, it cannot make final decryption form <{g kj*(Q) , α j }, {g uj*(Q) , β j }, {g vj*(Q) , γ j }> satisfy relation α j βj+Λ = γ j because each M q (q > 1) does not know value D j at a time when it decrypts F q (D j ). Also, anyone can examine relation G d = y * a1+a2+ ---+aN+κ1+κ2+ ---+κQ because y * and κ 1 , κ 2 , ---, κ Q are publicly known.
In the above, mix-server M 1 in the decryption stage which calculates final decryption forms can know D 1 , ---, D N as an exception. But verifier E can detect dishonesties easily if the liable mix-server is M 1 . Namely, when mix- is not equal to {D j g kj*(Q)·x*(q) /D j g kj*(Q)·x*(q-1) } Ψ . Verification of {E q-1 (D j ), E q (D j )} is trivial, i.e. M q can disclose integer k j (q), because its value is changed at every encryption different from secret key x(q). Also, although E must verify behaviors of mix-servers in the unknown number generation stage if mix-servers in the encryption and decryption stages are honest, these verifications are trivial. As same as in the encryption stage each M q can disclose its secret integers s j (q) and r j (q).
Provided that a dishonest mix-server is not M 1 in the encryption stage or a mix-server in the unknown number generation stage, it is also straightforward to recalculate consistent final decryption result F 0 (D j ) without knowing corresponding entity V j . But, when M 1 in the encryption stage or a mix-server in the unknown number generation stage is dishonest, entities other than V j may know the
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correspondence between V j and D j , i.e. E Q (D j ) was decrypted already and the above procedure for identifying dishonest mix-servers reaches E 0 (D j ) that was put by V j . By the same reason, V j cannot maintain D j as its secret when it put D j illegitimately. M * removes these threats by making V j anonymous. In addition about the latter threat, V j itself is responsible for the disclosure of its secrets.
Finally, it must be noted that because y * , g a1+ ---+aN and κ 1 , κ 2 , ---, κ Q are publicly known, any entity can confirm correct behaviors of SVRM without communicating with mix-servers. Therefore, although Diffie and Hellman scheme that requires interactions between a verifier and mix-servers is necessary to identify dishonest mix-servers, actual efficiency of SVRM is not degraded. Usually mixservers are honest, i.e. they cannot continue their businesses once their dishonesties are detected.
Anonymous Tag Based Credential
Provided that A is an authority that issues credentials and Z is a secret integer of entity V, anonymous tag based credential T(A, V, Z) enables V to show its eligibility to any entity E without revealing its identity. In addition, E can force V to calculate used seal U Z mod B from given integer U by using integer Z in T(A, V, Z) honestly without knowing Z itself (B is a publicly known appropriate integer associated with T(A, V, Z), and notation mod B is omitted in the following). Then, E can use U Z as an evidence that V had shown T(A, V, Z) to it. Here, actually V shows T(A, V, Z) to E in form T(A, V, Z) W while generating secret integer W. Also, to maintain uniqueness of used seal U Z , V calculates a set of values U 1 Z , U 2 Z , ---, U T Z from multiple integers U 1 , U 2 , ---, U T . In conclusion, together with used seal U Z anonymous credential T(A, V, Z) satisfies unforgeability, soundness, anonymity, unlinkability, revocability and verifiability as below [13, 15, 16] . 
Revised-SVRM
To adapt SVRM to e-voting systems this section modifies it to revised-SVRM. Provided that V j and D j in Figure 2 are a voter and its vote respectively, SVRM cannot protect V j from coercer C, who is forcing V j to choose C's designating candidate S. Namely, V j must disclose integers b j , c j and pair <{g 
Modified Unknown Number Generation Stage
To disable entities to force V j to reveal attribute value D j , revised-SVRM modifies the unknown number generation stage as shown in Figure 3 . Here, as same as in Figure 2 , although there is an exception information sent from mix-servers and each entity V j is publicly disclosed also in revised-SVRM. The modified unknown number generation stage proceeds as follow. (1) , (gy * ) δj3•sj(1) }, and sends them to M 2 .
4. M q (q > 1) that receives {g sj*(q-1) , D j* (q-1)y * sj*(q-1) }, {g uj*(q-1) , r j* (q-1)y * uj*(q-1) } and {g δj1·sj*(q-1) , y * δj2·sj*(q-1) , (gy * ) δj3·sj*(q-1) } from M q-1 calculates pairs {g sj*(q) , D j* (q)y * sj*(q) }, {g uj*(q) , r j* (q)y * uj*(q) } and triplet {g δj1·sj*(q) , y * δj2·sj*(q)
, (gy * ) δj3·sj*(q) }, and forwards them to M q+1 . Where, s j* (q) = s j (1)+ ---+s j (q), u j* (q) = u j (1)+ ---+u j (q), D j* (q) = D j (1)D j (2) ---D j (q), r j* (q) = r j (1)r j (2) ---r j (q) and D j* (Q) = D j , r j* (Q) = R j . 5. M Q that calculates pairs {g sj*(Q) , D j y * sj*(Q) }, {g uj*(Q) , R j y * uj*(Q) } and triplet {g δj1·sj*(Q) = μ j1 , y * δj2·sj*(Q) = μ j2 , (gy * ) δj3·sj*(Q) = μ j3 } in the previous step forwards the pairs to V j and M 1 . M Q sends also {μ j1 , μ j2 , μ j3 } to V j . 6. V j which receives {g sj*(Q) , D j y * sj*(Q) }, {g uj*(Q) , R j y * uj*(Q) } and {μ j1 , μ j2 , μ j3 } confirms that {g sj*(Q) , D j y * sj*(Q) } is a correct encryption form of D j , i.e. g sj*(Q) and y * sj*(Q) (= D j y * sj*(Q) /D j ) in it are calculated as g and y * to the power of same unknown integer s j* (Q). Then, no one can know integer u j* (Q) or R j unless all mix-servers conspire. Therefore, entities cannot calculate D j from pair {g uj*(Q) , g uj*(Q)·Dj•(Dj+Λ) } or {R j y * uj*(Q) , (R j y * uj*(Q) ) Dj•(Dj+Λ) } even if they examine every possible value of D j . In addition, each D j (q) sent to M q is a secret of V j and M q , and as a result, V j can conceal D j even from entity C that is coercing it if erasable-state voting booths are available. Namely, at a time when C asks V j to disclose D j , V j can convince C that any value S is consistent with E 0 * (D j ). Here, an erasable-state voting booth is a one of which memory states are initialized after an entity in it exits. It also disables entities to record the information that they had received and generated in it. This means V j does not need to reply with the correct value when it is asked about D j by others.
Nevertheless both V j and mix-servers can confirm that E 0 * (D j ) finally generated by V j is legitimate, i.e. V j verifies them as below and components of E 0 * (D j ) put by V j were calculated by mix-servers themselves. Although V j and M q can construct inconsistent E 0 * (D j ) if they conspire, this dishonesty can be disabled by making V j anonymous, i.e. among attribute values of other anonymous entities M q cannot identify V j 's one.
About the verification of {g sj*(Q) , D j y * sj*(Q) } at step 6, V j can verify it by confirming relations g sj*(Q)·δj1 = μ j1 , y * sj*(Q)·δj2 = μ j2 and (g sj*(Q) y * sj*(Q) ) δj3 = μ j3 through the scheme of Diffie and Hellman. Namely, because discrete logarithm problems are difficult to solve mix-servers that do not know δ j1 , δ j2 or δ j3 must calculate g sj*(Q) and y * sj*(Q) by using same s j* (Q) to satisfy the above relations. Verification of {g uj*(Q)·Dj•(Dj+Λ) , (R j y * uj*(Q) ) Dj•(Dj+Λ) } at step 9 is easy; for V j that knows D j and Λ it is trivial to confirm that g uj*(Q)·Dj•(Dj+Λ) and (R j y * uj*(Q) ) Dj•(Dj+Λ) in it are calculated as g uj*(Q) and R j y * uj*(Q) to the power of D j (D j +Λ), i.e. {g uj*(Q)·Dj•(Dj+Λ) , (R j y * uj*(Q) ) Dj•(Dj+Λ) } is a consistent encryption form of R j Dj•(Dj+Λ) .
Encryption and Decryption Stages
Mix-servers in the encryption and decryption stages behave in the same way as in Figure 1 
Verifying Behaviors of Revised-SVRM
Revised-SVRM Based Voting Scheme
This section develops a voting scheme while exploiting revised-SVRM, anonymous tag based credentials and erasable-state voting booths. The scheme consists of voters V 1 , V 2 , ---, V N , election authority A and mix-servers M 1 , M 2 , ---, M Q in the encryption, decryption and unknown number generation stages. Elections proceed through the voter registration, voting, pre-tallying and tallying phases as below.
Voter Registration
Firstly, each voter V j shows its identity to election authority A at an entrance of an election site. After that, A gives credential T(A, V j , Z j ) to V j if it is eligible, and in exchange for the credential V j issues a receipt to A. that V j is anonymous and M q cannot identify V j 's vote. To handle V j 's vote illegitimately M q must take a risk that its dishonesty is revealed, i.e. V h claims M q is dishonest if M q generates an initial encryption form of V h 's vote inconsistently instead of V j 's one. In the same way, V j can protect itself from threats where conspiring mix-server M 1 
Features of the Developed Scheme
The e-voting scheme developed based on revised-SVRM satisfies all essential requirements of elections as follow.
Privacy As discussed in Sec. 3 and 5, no one except voter V j itself can know candidate D j that V j had chosen. But V j that did not register itself cannot conceal its abstention because voters register themselves by showing their identities. To conceal its abstention from others V j must register itself and put an invalid vote or leave the election site without entering a voting booth. Verifiability Anonymous credential ensures that only eligible entities can put votes, and used seals of credentials disable voters to put votes multiple times. About tallying, all votes put by voters and vote forms handled by mix-servers are publicly disclosed and revised-SVRM is verifiable. Then, anyone including third parties can verify the accuracy of elections.
Fairness
No one can know the interim election results because the scheme does not disclose votes in their plain forms until the end of the pre-tallying phase. Incoercibility Voter V j can conceal candidate D j in {E 0 * (D j ), E 0 * (D j , Ω)} from C that is coercing it, i.e. because D j is encrypted by using unknown integers, V j can declare that {E 0 * (D j ), E 0 * (D j , Ω)} is an encryption form of any candidate S. Also, erasable-state voting booths disable C to obtain enough information from V j to reconstruct D j even if C is conspiring with several mix-servers. Because inferior votes are not decrypted, C cannot confirm whether V j had chosen C's designating candidate S or not even when S is unique to V j . Here because V j is anonymous, as discussed at the end of Sec. 4.5, C cannot know the correspondence between initial encryption form {E 0 * (D j ), E 0 * (D j , Ω)} and final decryption result {F 0 * (D j ), F 0 * (D j , Ω)} even if it conspires with 1st mix-server M 1 in the encryption stage or mixservers in the unknown number generation stage. In detail, A in the voter registration phase gives credential T(A, V j , Z j ) to V j just before V j enters a voting booth, therefore V j cannot inform C or mix-servers of integer Z j in T(A, V j , Z j ) so that they can identify V j 's vote.
But it must be noted that C which is forcing V j to abstain from the election can confirm whether V j actually had abstained or not by asking V j to recalculate the used seal V j had calculated in the voter registration phase. This threat exists also in usual paper based elections, and currently an only way to remove this thereat is to introduce regulations that force all voters to visit election sites regardless that they choose valid candidates or not.
Even if election authority A gives 2 anonymous credentials T α and T β to V j , C can know whether V j actually had abstain or not. Namely, although V j can visit an election site without revealing its identity by showing T β (where V j obtains T β by showing T α that it had obtained in advance while showing its identity), C can know V j even from T β if it asks V j to disclose secrets in T β .
Robustness Because initial encryption form {E 0 * (D j ), E 0 * (D j , Ω)} of a vote put by voter V j is verified by mixservers and V j itself, V j cannot claim that mix-servers had constructed it illegitimately. Therefore, once encrypted votes are successfully disclosed, revised-SVRM enables reprocessing of votes until final decryption forms are disclosed correctly without reelections.
Conclusion
Based on revised-SVRM an e-voting scheme that satisfies all essential requirements of elections was developed, i.e. it satisfies requirements about privacy, verifiability, fairness, incoercibility and robustness. But the scheme assumes state-erasable voting booths. Therefore as one of future works, efficient schemes for implementing state-erasable voting booths must be developed.
